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RETROSPECTIVE SUCCESSION TAXES
RETROSPECTIVE SUCCESSION TAXES.
By ROBERT WALSTON CHUBB.
"Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested
agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and is generally
unjust and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule
that a law should have no retrospect."' If this wholesome
advice of Justice Chase in 1798 had been more generally ob-
served, much litigation would have been avoided, and fewer
issues raised to impede the administration of revenue laws.
For the construction and the validity of laws actually or ap-
parently retroactive in operation has many times been before
the courts, and perhaps more frequently in the case of in-
heritance taxes than any other.
The cases clearly attest the wisdom of the rille above cited.
The same attitude is evinced in one of the familiar ipaxims
of statutory construction. In U. S. v. Heth,2 the court said:
"Words in a statute ought not to have a retro-
spective application unless they are so clear, strong
and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed
to them, or unless the intention of the legislature can-
not otherwise be satisfied."
And the courts have. gone to great lengths in applying
this rule, both to ordinary excise taxes and to successive
taxes.
3
1. Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 Dallas, 386, 391.
2. 3 Cianch 3M9.
3. See U. S. v. But1, 150 U. S. 78, and U. S. v. American Sugar Refining
on,. ony (i05), 202 U. S. 563. In Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, the
Supieme Court refuked to hold that transfers made "at any time" included
txmnsfexs made piior t0 the pasage of the law. See also LewellVn . Frick
iecently decided in the Supreme Court (May 11, 1925).
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One of the interesting problems in the present application
of the federal estate tax law and state inheritance tax laws
which has recently been much discussed4 is the question of
just how long the Supreme 'Court will be willing to limit to
a rule of construction its evident repugnance to retroactive
laws, and just how far it will extend the "limited retroac-
tivity" heretofore approved in the income tax cases. The
problem is a recurrent one and is likely to come up in the near
future. Every one of the states (with the exception of
Florida) now has on its books a succession tax law in some
form, many of them retrospective; and notwithstanding the
views of our chief executive, the federal law, historically a
war measure, seems to remain a more or less permanent part
of the structure of the internal revenue laws.
Most of the litigation has arisen over the provisions of the
statutes which attempt to include in the estate, or tax as an
inheritance, property transferred and vested prior to the
passage of the law. The general disapproval of the courts,
which has been noted above, has been brought to bear on such
provisions many times. Mr. Justice McKenna in Shwab V.
Doyl directed his criticism at the Commissioner rather than
at the legislature. The case involved the construction of the
first of the present series of federal laws. This law included
in the gross estate, transfers made at any time, when in con-
templation of death or intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment upon death. The court said, referring to the
Commissioner: "He fixes no period to the retrospect which
4. See Am)berg, "Retroactive Excise Taxation," 37 Harvard Law Re*
view, 691. See also note on "Retrospective Operation of Succe3sion Tax,"
26 A. I,. R. 1461.
5. 258 U. S. 529, at p. 536.
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he declares, but reserves, if he be taken at his word, the trans-
fers of all time to the deirands of revenue. In this there is
much to allure an administrative officer. Indeed its simplicity
attracts anyone. It removes puzzle from construction and per-
plcxity and pertinence, on account of the distance of the death
from the transfer, risling no chances of courts or juries, in
repugnance cr revolt, taking liberties with the act to relieve
from its exactions to the demands of revenue."
Evidently there was "much to allure" Congress also in
this construction, for in passing the law of 1918 the interpre-
tation of the Commissioner was approved if not confirmed by
a declaration in the law which expressly included all such
transfers whether made before or after the passage of this
act.( The latter clause has not yet been passed upon by the
Supreme Court.
Furthermore the Congress seems to tend toward an ex-
tension of the retroactive principle. No further back than
1924 Congress forestalled the decision of the Supreme Court
in the recent case of Lewellyn v. Frick (decided May 11th,
1V25) by enacting a special section giving retroactive effect
to the provision which includes in the gross estate proceeds
of insurance payable to a named beneficiary.7
As a constitutional question, it is difficult to determine
just how far the Supreme Court would go in upholding re-
troactive succession taxes. Unlike many state constitutions,'
the Federal constitution contains no express prohibition
against retrospective laws, except in the case of criminal
6. Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 402 (c).
7. Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 302 (h).
8. See Constitution of Missouri 1875, Art. II See. 15.
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laws.9 The contention that the clause of the Constitution
prohibiting ex post facto laws, extended to inheritance tax
laws was hazarded in Carpenter v. Pennsylvania0 with the
usual result. But the case was of importance in establishing
the rule that an inheritance tax law may be retroactive in the
limited sense hereafter discussed.
In order to understand the extent of te doctrine in Car-
penter v. Pennsylvania it is necessary to consider at the outset
the nature of the succession tax in its various forms. Knowl-
ton v. Moore" is of course the leading case on this subject.
In tracing the American legislation to the English and con-
tinental death duties, Mr. Justice White furnished a sound
basis for the distinction, which has since held good, between
legacy or inheritance taxes, as imposed by most of the states
in this country, and probate or estate taxes, which are exem-
plified by our federal law. The case settled definitely that
both of these taxes are to be regarded as excise taxes, upon
the transmission and receipt of property by will or intestacy
or their equivalents. The estate tax, which originated in a
stamp tax upon letters of probate is regarded as a tax levie1
on the occasion of death at the beginning of the process of
devolution, and measured by the interest of the decedent therc-
by transmitted. The legacy or inheritance tax was stated
to be a tax levied upon the occasion of the receipt of property
by the living from the dead and measured by thq amount re-
ceived. The power to transmit and the right to receive are
conceived of as the privileges taxed.
Keeping this distinction in mind it will be seen that Car-
9. U. s. Constitution, Art. I Sec. 9 (3).
10. (1855) 17 How. (U. S.) 456.
11. (1900) 178 U. S. 41.
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Venter v. Pennsylvania, and similar cases upheld an applica-
tion of inheritance laws, which was not retroactive in any ae-
curate sense of the word. It was attempted in this case t0
tax an inheritance under a Pennsylvania statute enacted after
the death of the testator, but before the legacy had been paid.
The executor relied upon the fact that the legacy had, tech-
nically, vested and was not at that time taxable. The court
held the legacy taxable, admitting that in some senses the
rights of the legatees were vested, but added: "The rights
of the donee are subordinate to the conditions, formalities,
and administrative control prescribed by the state in the in-
terests of its public order, and are irrevocably established
upon its abdication of this control at the period of distribu-
tion. If the state, during this period of administration and
control by its tribunals and their appointees, thinks fit to
impose a tax upon the property, there is no obstacle in the
Constitution and laws of the United States to prevent it."
Such also is the effect of the decision in Cahen v. Brew-
ster,12 which upheld a law imposing an inheritance tax upon
successions and legacies wherever the estate was not settled
at the time of the passage of the law.
In these cases the property was still in gremio legis and
the cases make the point that since the tax is on the right to
receive and not on the property, it might be imposed at any
time before the succession was completed by final settlement.
The distinction is made clear in Stauffer's Succession
13
which arose in the same jurisdiction as Cahen v. Brewster. In
this case the legacies had not only vested in law but had also
12. (1906) 203 U. S. 543.
13. (1907) 119 La. 66, 43 So. 928.
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been received by the legatees, by delivery from the executors.
And it was held that in such case the tax could not be imposed
where both the delivery and vesting was complet6 prior to the
passage of the law.
It is accordingly believed that the question is still an open
one: May Congress or the states tax successions which have
completely vested at the time that the statute is enacted? The
cases most frequently arise, as above stated, under the pro-
visions which provide that transfers intended "to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after death," or transfers
made "in contemplation of death" shall be included as tax-
able parts of the estate or inheritance. The issue is not al-
ways clearly defined in these cases. The courts have not
agreed as to the meaning of either of the phrases. Under
the federal law alone, one line of authority holds that when
Congress referred to possession and enjoyment it meant the
actual "tradition" of the property, and would include as tax-
able transfers all vested remainders limited upon the life es-
tate of the grantor.1 4  The other line of cases represented by
Girard Trust Co. v. McCaughn'5 considers that the words re-
fer to the vesting in possession and enjoyment of the interest
in the property which is acquired by the transfer.1 The dis-
tinction is of course important where the retroactivity of the
statute is made the ground for contesting its validity. If the
privilege taxed is the privilege of actually receiving the prop-
erty in possession, undelayed by the intervention of any inter-
14. Shukc t v. Ailen (U. S. D. C. Nebr. 1924), (3C0 Fed. 754), states
this view wi~h cleirness and force.
15. 3 Fed. (2d.) 618 (D. C. Pa. 1925), See also Lynch v. Congn (1924),
C. C. A. 8th cire. F. (2d) 133.
16. This view seems decidedly strained. For the traditional use of the
oics "*,,oe_-_iL and en:oymnt" see Blackstone, Bk. 1I Chap. 11.
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mediate estate, then a law which is in force and imposes the
tax upon the occasion of the termination of the intermediate
estate would not be retroactive. If, on the other hand, the
technical "vesting" of the estate (even an estate in expect-
ancy) is the occasion for the tax, thereafter enacted, then no
privilege or power remains to be exercised upon the termina-
tion of the intermediate estate and a tax upon the vesting
u ould be retroactive.
A number of cases have considered the validity of retro-
a'tive application of inheritance or transfer taxes to transfers
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death. The case of Hunt v. Wicht17 goes further than any
other, by holding that a conveyance of the fee by deed placed
in escrow, to be delivered upon the grantor's death, can not
be taxed under a statute that was not in force at the date of
the deed even though it was in force at the time of the grant-
or's death, and which expressly included transfers made be-
fore the passage of the act. The court took (somewhat ques-
tionable) the view that the whole interest vested at once at the
time of the delivery of the deed, 8 but on principle concluded
that it could not be taxed. This case followed a series of
New York cases.
Granting that in Hunt v. Wicht the court's view of the oc-
casion for the tax is correct, as a matter of construction, this
line of authority would support the view that taxing of vested
interests is invalid. The cases are not explicit as to the prin-
ciples on which they are based. A recent writer on retro-
17. (1917) 174 calif. 206.
18. Matter cf Pd (1922), 171 N. Y. 48. In re ciaig, (97) App. Div. 289
affd. %ithout orinon-181 N. Y. 551.
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active taxation19 has made the point, citing the New York cases
and other authorities; that the laws, being fundamentally
excise laws, cannot be applied to tax a privilege which has
already been exercised. "If the taxpayer has already com-
pleted the transaction, a tax upon the privilege of consum-
mating it is a contradiction in terms." The same reasoning
appears in the New York case of In re Craig,20 where the
court said:
"The underlying principle that supports the tax is that
such right is not a natural one, but is in fact a privilege only,
and that the authority conferring the privilege may impose
conditions upon its exercise. But when the privilege has
ripened into a right, it is too late to impose conditions of the
character in question, and when the right is conferred by a
lawfully executed grant or contract it is property and not a
privilege, and as such is protected from legislative encroach-
ment by constitutional guarantees."
As to Federal taxation which so offends, contentions of its
invalidity are based upon the constitutional provision that a
direct tax may not be imposed by Congress unless appor-
tioned.21 Something of the same argument appeared in the
lower court's decision in Lewellyn v. Frick22 where the court
said that inclusion in the estate of proceeds of insurance as-
signed prior to the enactment of the law amounted to a tax on
property,-- 'the levying of a direct tax without apportion-
ment as required by the constitution."
19. Julius Auberg, Esq., in 37 Harvard Law Review, 691, April, 1924.
20. Supra, footnote (18).
21. Constitution Art. I Sec. 9 (4).
22. (D. C. Pa. 1924) 298 Fed. 803. While affirmed by the Supreme
Court, the latter court did not approve this position. Its decision was based
on the rule of Shwab v. Doyle, that the statute was not clearly retroactive.
256
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The soundness of this line of reasoning seems clear in the
case of inheritance taxes. But in the case of estate taxes it
is not so clear that the contention is available. It must be
admitted that the federal estate tax is an excise tax and only
valid as such.23 However, as a practical matter, it would be
difficult to prove in any case that no succession took place
upon the death of the decedent. And if such succession is
properly the occasion for the tax, the inquiry is more properly
as to whether the measure of the tax is reasonable, or arbi-
trary and confiscatory.
There is some authority to support the contention that it
is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the taxing power
to include in the measure of an estate tax, property which was
transferred plior to the enactment of the law. The case of
Coolidge v. Nichols24 recently decided in the U. S. District
Court for Massachusetts was a case involving a transfer of
the second class, namely, a transfer in contemplation of
death. Here the court disposed of the argument above set
forth in the following words:
"It has been stated that the nature of an excise or
indirect tax forbids retro-active operation; that to ex-
act a tax upon the privilege of consummating a trans-
fer after it is completed leaves no choice in the tax-
payer and the tax becomes an unavoidable and abso-
lute demand, thereby losing its essential characteris-
tics as an excise or indirect tax and becomes in effect
a direct assessment upon the property itself simply
because of ownership and as such is unconstitutional
23. N. Y. Tust co. v. E,8?er, 256 U. S. 345 upholding the state tax law
of 1916.
24. 4 Fed. (2d) 112 (D. C. Mass. 1925).
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unless apportioned among the states .... But after
careful examination of the authorities on this point I
am not prepared to state as my opinion that Congress
has not authority to give retroactive effect to a law
providing an indirect tax."
We are thrown back then, on the contention that the meas-
ure of the tax in such cases is arbitrary and unreasonable and
a taking of property without due process of law contrary to
the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment as the case might be.
There is some support for this view. It has been stated that
regulations are invalid where they are "so beyond all reason-
able relation to the subject to which they are applied as to
amount to mere arbitrary usurpation of power." 25  It is also
established, that while the Fifth Amendment does not limit
the taxing power, nevertheless, it applies where a tax is so
unreasonable and arbitrary as to amount to, a confiscation of
property.26
This is the position of the court in Coolidge v. Nichols,
where the court held that a transfer said to be in contempla-
tion of death, which was completed prior to the enactment of
the law could not be validly taxed, and said: "I am unable
25. Lemieuz xv. Young, 211 U. S. 489.
26. Brushaber v. Union Pacific. 240 U. S. 1. Cooley, ConstLuttonll
Limitations (7th ed.), p. 695. In the Brushaber ca-e, after calling attention
to the rule that the Fifth Amendment could not be construed as a limitation
on the taxing power, the Court stated that:
"This doctrine N ould have no application in a case where, although
there was a seeming exercise of the taxing po~ier, the act com-
plained of was so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it
was not the exertion of taxation, but a ccnflscation of property,
that is, a taking of the same In violation of the 5th Amendment; or
what is equivalent thereto, was so wanting in basis for classiflca-
tion as to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to Inevi-
tably lead to the same conclusion."
258
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to see on what grounds it could be successfully claimed that
the transfer in question or the property transferred could be
said to bear any reasonable relation to the tax."
"In every case of transmission by will, intestate
laws or transfers to take effect after death or in con-
templation of death, a power, right or privilege has
been exerted or exercised. When one has availed him-
self of this privilege, with knowledge of the tax, actual
or constructive, he has voluntarily subjected himself
to its burden, and a statute which includes in the
measure of the tax the value of the property thus
transferred may well be deemed to have provided a
reasonable classification, and this even if the decedent
has entirely parted with all control over, or interest
in the property; but when one has, prior to the im-
position of the tax, parted with all control over, or
interest in the property, the classification becomes ar-
bitrary and unreasonable. Such arbitrary inclusion of
the property of others has been held in other jurisdic-
tions invalid as unconstitutional."
In other words, there is no connection between a transfer
which has completely vested prior to the passage of the law
and an estate or inheritance taxed by such law. If the trans-
fer is included as the equivalent of a testamentary disposition,
it must be held that a testamentary devise, completed prior
to the enactment of the law, could likewise be taxed by sub-
sequent enactment. It is doubted whether any court would
go so far. If the transfer is included merely to prevent eva-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sion of the tax, as has been suggested,2 7 it is only necessary
to point out that no intent can be found to evade a non-exis-
tent law.28- The transfer bears no relation to the death of the
decedent, which is the occasion for the tax.
It remains to dispose of the income tax cases which are so
frequently cited as authority for the validity of retroactive
laws.29 The cases referred to, almost without exception, ap-
prove the imposition of taxes on the income for a current
year, by a law passed in the same year. There are a number
of grounds for distinguishing these cases. In the first place,
income taxes must, since Pollock v. Farmers Loan c Trust
Company, 0 be regarded as something more than indirect
taxes. Second, the cases all involved taxation of annual in-
come of a year not yet expired, when it could hardly be said
that the occasion for the tax (if regarded as an excise) hal
arisen. These distinctions also apply even where the recipient
of the income had died,31 or its corporate existence term-
27. The Court in the Coolidge case suggests that the prevention of
evasion is the purpose of inclusion of such transfers:
"The right to impose a tax carries with it the right to adopt all
reasonable measures to prevent an evasion of the tax. On this
ground the power to measure an estate tax may properly be ex-
tended to gifts in contemplation of death, or gifts to take effect
after death, because both are transfers in the nature of testamentary
dispositions and could be easily resorted to for the purpose of evad-
ing the tax."
28. See Brown v. Pennsylvania Co. (Delaware 1924), 126 Atl. 715.
29. Brushaber v. Union Pacific. 240 U. S. L
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. 240 U. S. 103.
Tyce Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U. S. 115.
Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118 et seq.
See also Stockdate v. Atlantic Insurance Co. (1873), 20 Wall. 323,
which was decided at a time when the income tax was still regarded
as an excise.
30. 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759.
31. Brady v. Anderson, (C. C. A. 2 Cire.), 240 Fed. 665.
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inated32 prior to the enactment of the law, and even though
all of the income had accrued during a portion of the year
when no law was in effect. Income taxes in theory must be
considered sui generis for they are in the nature of direct
taxes upon property. Yet the source from which derived is
immaterial and no lien attaches to the property for failure to
pay the tax.
On the other hand, nothing is better settled than that both
estate and inheritance taxes are excise taxes in their nature.33
Furthermore, in the typical succession tax, while the tax is on
the power to transmit or the right to receive, the measure of
the tax is specific property. And under the federal law even
in the case of transfers vested before any law is in effect, a
lien would attach to the property.34 A case might arise where
a decedent had made so many gifts that his entire estate,
which we may assume was disposed of by will to deserving
objects, would be insufficient to pay the tax, so that it would
of necessity be paid out of property long since transferred to
others.
In conclusion, it is believed that retroactive application
of the estate tax laws will be held unconstitutional, if at all,
not because such application results technically, in direct tax-
ation by the federal government, but because of the broader
considerations, applicable alike to state and federal legisla-
32. U. B. v. Boss & Peake, 290 Fed. 167.
U. H. V. Updike, 1 F. 2nd 550.
U. S. v. McHatton, 266 Fed. 602.
33. N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345.
Knowlton v. Moore, supra.
Magoun v. Illinois Trust & savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 Led. 1037.
34. Revenue Act of 1918 Sec. 409. And see similar piovisions in sub-
sequent acts.
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tion, namely that retro-active taxation is a denial of due pro-
cess of law. A limited retro-activity may be countenanced, as
in the income tax cases. But unless some limit is placed upon
retro-activity in succession taxes, it may be confidently as-
serted that a case will sooner or later arise in which the
Supreme Court will set its own limit and decide that a tax
upon a succession measured by property transferred before
the tax was enacted, is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of the taxing power.
That the retro-active application of succession taxes re-
sults in injustice cannot be denied. While all men hold their
property subject to the right of the state to tax, they should
be protected in their acts and in the disposition of their prop-
erty by a reasonable assurance that the consequences of those
acts will be determined by existing law-not by some inde-
terminable future law. It is enough to hold a man to a
knowledge of what the law is, at any given time, (especially if
it be the law of taxation); knowing the law, he should at least
be enabled to predict with reasonable precision the legal con-
sequences of his own acts. That an individual should act at
his own peril as to future laws which may entirely change the
color of his act,-is to. deny him the security of law, and cer-
tainly cannot be within any proper conception of due process
of law.
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